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A PROPOSED NEW
FEDERAL INTERMEDIATE
APPEL LA TE COURT*

Charles R. Haworth**
Daniel J. Meador***

The growing inability of the federal appellate courts to produce
authoritative resolutions to certain important questions of national
law is one of the most critical problems facing the American legal
system today. This article addresses this condition. To expand the
capacity of the federal judicial system for definitive adjudication of
issues of national law, this article recommends the creation of a
new intermediate appellate court that would contribute to the uniformity and predictability of legal doctrine in important areas of
litigation. In the long run, the new court would also have the effect of reducing the volume of cases that comes before the federal
appellate courts.
The proposed new court would be formed by merging the Court
of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals into a
single appellate court at the same level as the courts of appeals.
The court's jurisdiction would include that of the two existing
courts, and in addition, exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals in patent, civil tax, and environmental cases from the United States District Courts and the United States Tax Court. Further review
would be in the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari. The court
would be headquartered in Washington, D. C.
This article begins with an analysis of the recent history of federal appellate court reform efforts. It then focuses on three areas
of federal litigation - tax law, patent law, and environmental law
- in which there are exceptional needs for uniformity in the law but
in which uncertainty in legal doctrine is especially pronounced. To
*This article is based on a proposal that was circulated in July 1978 by the Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice of the Department of Justice. The ideas expressed here vary somewhat from the original proposal. The authors express their appreciation
to Paul Nejelski, Denis Hauptly, James McMullin, and Scott Taylor of that Office for their
efforts in the development of the original proposal. Appreciation is expressed to Joan Barton, an attorney in the Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice, for editorial
assistance in the preparation of this article for publication. The views expressed are the authors' and not necessarily those of the Office or the Department of Justice.
•• Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas. Member of the Texas Bar. B.A. 1965, J.D. 1967, University of Texas at Austin.
••• Assistant Attorney General, Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice,
Department of Justice.
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make the law more uniform and predictable in these areas, the article proposes the new intermediate appellate court and sets forth in
detail the jurisdiction arid structure of this court. The article concludes by pointing out aspects of this proposal that should make it
especially advantageous and also more acceptable than previous
recommendations for appellate court reorganization.
J.

RECENT FEDERAL APPELLATE COURT

REFORM EFFORTS

Those who observe the administration of justice have long recognized a basic problem of the federal appellate court system-too
many appeals for too few judges. Although the number of cases has
grown steadily in the past, since 1960 the federal courts have experienced what one commentator has called "exploding dockets."1 In addition to delay and increased expense for individual
parties, this court congestion has exacerbated the federal appellate
system's lack of adequate capacity for authoritative declaration of
national law. In response to these conditions, additional judgeships
have been created 2 and several modifications of the structure of the
federal appellate courts have been proposed in recent years.
A. The Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court

The earliest court reform efforts of the 1970's focused on the
Supreme Court. Filings in the Court increased from 1,234 cases in
the 1951 Term to 3,643 cases in the 1971 Term. 3 During the 1971
Term, however, only 143 cases were decided, 129 by full opinions
and 14 by per curiam opinions. 4 The stark disparity between 143
cases disposed of by full opinion and 3,643 cases in which review
was sought but was either denied or was afforded only through
1
Brown, Federal Special Verdicts: The Doubt Eliminator in Proceedings of the Annual
Judicial Conference for the Tenth Judicial Circuit of the United States, 44 F.R.D. 245,338

(1967). From 1962 to 1977, filings in the courts of appeals increased by 296.4%, but the number of judges increased only 24%. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, 1977 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 4, Table 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT for the respective year] (The ANNUAL REPORT can be located with the JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CoNFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES for the respective year). The number of cases filed in the Supreme
Court underwent a lesser, but equally significant, growth. See G. CASPER & R. PosNER, THE
WORKWAD OF THE SUPREME CouRT 3 (1976) (updating A Study of the Supreme Court's
Caseload, 3 J. LEG. STUDIES 339 (1974)).
2 The Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (to be codified at 28
U .S.C § 132 note), authorizes the addition of 117 district judges and 35 circuit judges to the
federal judiciary. See text accompanying notes 41-43 infra.
3
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE
SUPREME COURT 2 (1972) [hereinafter cited as STUDY GROUP].

'Id.at 5.

,
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summary procedures fostered attempts to remedy this shortfall in
the declaration of national law.
In 1971, Chief Justice Burger expressed his concern about docket
conditions in the Supreme Court when, under the auspices of the
Federal Judicial Center, he appointed a Study Group chaired by
Professor Paul Freund to investigate docket congestion in the
Court. 5 The Study Group reported in December 1972 that the Court
was overburdened, principally because of the need to screen a
greatly increased volume of petitions for certiorari to determine
which cases were worthy of consideration. 6 This burden, the Study
Group concluded, had led to failure to review issues that would
have been decided in previous years, thereby preventing the Court
from discharging its historic function of resolving conflicting decisions among the circuits and otherwise authoritatively settling important questions of federal law. 7
To alleviate the problem, the Study Group recommended the
creation of a National Court of Appeals. This court would be composed of seven judges of the existing courts of appeals, who would
be designated to sit on a rotating basis. The court could decide
some cases on the merits, but the major responsibility of the proposed court would be to screen certiorari petitions that would have
previously been filed in the Supreme Court. From the National
Court of Appeals, about 400 cases a year would be passed to the
Supreme Court for further screening and possible review. 8
This recommendation provoked substantial controversy and a
large volume of literature. 9 Several major objections to the proposal were expressed: the National Court of Appeals violated the
"one supreme court" requirement of Article III; the new court
would deprive the Supreme Court of a large measure of control
over its own docket and would thereby decrease the Court's ability
to control the development of the law and to take the pulse of the
nation's legal system; the appearance of universal accessibility to
the Supreme Court- echoed in the folk sayings of America as
"taking it all the way to the Supreme Court" - would be sacrificed; screening was a relatively small part of the Court's workload; and the Court in fact was not overworked. In addition, the

Id. at ix.
Id. at 5, 7.
7
Id. at I, 4, 6.
8
Id. at 18-24.
• Some of the most recent collections of authorities are G. CASPER & R. POSNER, supra
note I, at xi n.2; Haworth, Circuit Splitting and the ''New" National Court of Appeals: Can
the Mouse Roar?, 30 Sw. L.J. 839, 856 n.135 (1976); Leventhal, A Modest Proposal for a
Multi-Circuit Court of Appeals, 24 AM. U.L. REv. "881, 889 n.25 (1975).
5

6
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composition of the Study Group was strongly criticized. 10
Moreover, the proposal was disapproved because it was directed
only toward the Supreme Court, while many observers perceived
that it was the regional courts of appeals that were truly inundated .1 1
Although the proposal of the Freund Committee was the product
of an able group of lawyers and academics, it gained little acceptance and was dead within a year . 12 The report did, however, serve
to focus attention on weaknesses in the federal appellate system,
and it led to further serious efforts to deal with those problems.
B. The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate
System

Limitations on the capacity of the Supreme Court and its possible overload are not the only difficulties that beset the federal appellate system. Serious fighting and dying is also done in the
trenches of the regional courts of appeals. The ballooning
caseloads of these eleven geographically-organized courts, combined with the fact that only one reviewing court-the Supreme
Court-can render decisions that are binding nationwide, have
caused serious problems in the functioning of the federal appellate
system at this intermediate level.
The present framework of the courts of appeals, created by Congress in 1891, 13 served its function well until the courts were beset
by their current difficulties. The jurisdiction of the appellate courts
is almost completely a matter of the litigant's right rather than an
exercise of the court's discretion. 14 Ostensibly, all appeals to these
courts must be decided on the merits rather than simply be
screened for review, as is the case in the Supreme Court. 15 Consequently, it is this level of courts that has carried the brunt of the
10
See, e.g., Burger & Warren, Retired Chief Justice Warren Attacks, Chief Justice
Burger Defends Freund Study Group's Composition and Proposal, 59 A.B.A.J. 721 (1973).
11
Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 174, 176-77 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); G. CASPER & R. POSNER, supra note I, at 77; Brennan, Justice Brennan Calls National Court of Appeals Proposal "Fundamentally Unnecessary and Ill Advised," 59
A.B.A.J. 835, 836 (1973); Haworth, Screening and Summary Procedures in the United
States Courts of Appeals, 1973 WASH. U.L.O. 257, 324 n.333 (1973).
12
Leventhal, supra note 9, at 889-90 (1975) (reduced to a "residue of embers in legal journals").
13 Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891 (Evarts Act), ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (current version
codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
14 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 3901,
at 398 (1976).
•• We say "ostensibly" because wide-spread screening procedures involving the denial of
oral argument and the decision of cases without opinion have the earmarks of discretionary
review. See D. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME 168-70 (1974); Haworth, supra note II.
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legal explosion. Since the 1960's, the intermediate appellate courts
have experienced exponential docket growth. For example, in 1962
only 4,823 cases were filed in the eleven regional courts of appeals . 16 By 1977, however, the number of filings in these courts
had risen to 19,188. 17 During that same 15 year period, the number
of circuit court judges rose from seventy-eight to ninety-seven. 18
Thus the growth in filings outpaced the number of additional appellate judgeships by a 12-to-1 ratio . 19
Under our federal judicial system, no court other than the Supreme Court is capable ofrenderingjudgments that constitute binding precedents nationwide in all courts. 20 In earlier decades of this
century, the Supreme Court annually reviewed a sufficient number
of cases from the lower courts so that significant intercircuit conflicts were eliminated and a satisfactory level of uniformity in federal law was maintained. 21
Today, however, the Supreme Court is giving plenary consideration on the merits to less than one percent of the cases decided by
the courts of appeals. 22 The lack of supervision that results from
1971 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note I, at 99, Table 2.
1977 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note I, at 300, Table Bl.
18 Id. at 300, Table I.
19
Increased filings in the last decade in these courts have caused alterations in the appellate system that are difficult to explain or justify on any basis other than extreme overload.
Every court of appeals except the Second Circuit has a rule authorizing denial of oral argument in cases, and most circuits use their rule extensively. Haworth, supra note 11, at 26566. Five circuits have local rules providing for affirmance without written opinion. Id. at 271.
The mass production of justice through overuse of clerks and staff, to the extent that this
condition exists, threatens both the correcting and institutional functions of an appeal by
substituting the decision of a nameless, faceless, staff attorney for that of an Article III
judge. See generally D. MEADOR, supra note 15. These procedures are hard to reconcile with
the characteristics of the system most essential to preserve if the appearance and realities of
appellate justice are to be maintained. See P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG,
JUSTICE ON APPEAL 7-9 (1976) [hereinafter cited as JUSTICE ON APPEAL]. The imperatives
detailed by these authors are missing today to some extent in the federal courts of appeals.
20
JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 19, points to two results of this lack of authority:
16

17

One is that there is a significant volume of repetitive litigation which is a needless
cost to litigants and a burden on the courts. The other is that there is an unsettling
effect on legal planning. This effect can be especially mischievous in areas of the
national law which are the most intricate, and the most intensively litigated: taxation, utility regulation, environmental protection, patents and perhaps antitrust.
Id. at 211.
21 In the early years following the Judiciary Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 936 (co.dified in scattered
sections of 28 U .S.C.), the Supreme Court granted approximately one-sixth of the petitions
for certiorari. See Frankfurter & Landis, The Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of
1925, 42 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 (1928).
.
22
Hufstedler, Courtship and Other- Legal Arts, 60 A.B.A.J. 545, 546-47 (1974); see Griswold, Rationing Justice - The Supreme Court's Caseload and What the Court Does Not Do,
60 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 341 (1975). Between 1974 and 1976, The Supreme Court gave plenary consideration to between 175 and 179 cases each term. See Hellman, The Business of
the Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 1925: The Plenary Docket in the 1970's, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1711, 1727 n.74 (1978). This compared with approximately 15,500 and 18,400
cases filed annually in the courts of appeals during the same period. 1977 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note I, at 305, Table 83.
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this limited review reduces the institutional responsibility of the
appellate courts. Judges know that the likelihood that any decision
they make will become the subject of a full hearing before the Supreme Court is very slight. 23 On many issues, there is no definitive
legal ruling that must be followed. As a result, it is not unusual for
the appellate courts to reach different decisions on the same issue.
Moreover, even where there is no actual conflict among the circuits, uncertainties exist in federal law that cannot be readily resolved authoritatively. In addition, the likelihood of uneven adjudication within each circuit has grown as the number of judges
has increased; in the larger circuits, the en bane procedure has decreased in effectiveness as a means of definitively establishing the
law of the circuit. 24
Congress responded to this problem in October 1972 by creating
the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, chaired by then-Senator Roman Hruska. The Commission
was directed to suggest changes in boundaries for the courts of appeals and in the structure and internal procedures of those courts. 25
The Commission's first report recommended splitting the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits, thereby creating two new regional courts of
appeals. 26 This proposal has yet to be enacted by Congress. 27
The second report of the Hruska Commission dealt with court
structure. As with the Study Group, the recommendation was for a

23
See Griswold, supra note 22, at 341-42; see also D. MEADOR, CONSUMERS OF JUSTICE:
How THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS 13-14 (1975).
24
JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 19, at 161-63. See Note, En Banc Review in Federal
Circuit Courts: A Reassessment, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1637 (1974).
25
Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807, as amended by Act of Sept. 19,
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-420, 88 Stat 1153.
26
COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, THE GEOGRAPHICAL 8oUNDARIES OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
CHANGE 9 (1973), reprinted in 62 F.R.D. 223, 232 (1974) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION,
GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES]. This recommendation to split circuits, if enacted, would
probably increase the burden on the Supreme Court.
27
In passing its version of the Omnibus Judgeship Bill in 1977, the Senate split the Fifth
Circuit but left the Ninth Circuit intact. S. 11, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The House of
Representatives version did not divide either circuit. H.R. 7843, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
As finally enacted, the Omnibus Judgeship Act added lljudgeships to the Fifth Circuit, for a
total of 26 judgeships, and IO judgeships to the Ninth Circuit for a total of 23 judgeships. Act
of Oct. 20, 1978 (Omnibus Judgeship Act) Pub. L.No. 95-486, § l, 92 Stat. 1629 (To be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 133 note). The Act did not divide the circuits but did provide as follows:

Sec. 6. Any court of appeals having more than 15 active judges may constitute
itself into administrative units complete with such facilities and staff as may be prescribed by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and may perform
its en bane function by such number of members of its en bane courts as may be
prescribed by rule of the court of appeals.

Id. at§ 6 (To be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41 note).
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new court to be called a National Court of Appeals. 28 But
little about the Hruska Commission's National Court resembled
the Study Group's court, other than the name and the fact that each
would have been a new tribunal inserted between the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court. The Hruska Commission benefitted
from reactions to the earlier proposal, 29 as well as from the contemporaneous work of the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice
chaired by Professor Maurice Rosenberg. 30 As a result, the Hruska
Commission came to perceive the problems differently, and the
Commission's proposal avoided most of the criticisms of the Study
Group's recommendation. 31
The National Court of Appeals devised by the Hruska Commission would have had the power to decide a substantial number of
cases on the merits, but its jurisdiction would have consisted solely
of cases referred by the Supreme Court or transferred from the
courts of appeals. 32 It would have been composed of permanent
Article III judges. 33
The Hruska Commission proposal was premised on the need to
"increase the capacity of the federal judicial system for definitive
adjudication of issues of national law" to remedy what the Commission characterized as the problem of "unnecessary and undesirable uncertainty.' ' 34 The Commission pointed to four major consequences of the appellate court system's lack of adequate capacity for the declaration of national law: (1) the Supreme Court's failure adequately to resolve conflicts among the circuits; (2) delay; (3)
the burden upon the Supreme Court of hearing cases not clearly
worthy of its attention; and (4) uncertainty in the law caused by potential intercircuit conflict, even though actual conflict might never
develop. 35 An additional problem, identified as particularly true of
patent law, was said to be the Supreme Court's inability to monitor
28
COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE
AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE vii-viii, 30-39 (1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 199-200, 236-47 (1976) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION: STRUCTURE].
29 See note 9 supra.
30
ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE, Recommendation for Improving the
Federal Intermediate Appellate System, in IV APPELLATE JUSTICE: 1975 MATERIALS FOR A
NATIONAL CONFERENCE, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, JANUARY 23-26, at 163-64 (1975) [hereinafter cited as APPELLATE JUSTICE: 1975). The advisory council was an independent group
of 30 lawyers, judges, and academicians which functioned from 1971 to 1975 as an advisory
board to the Federal Judicial Center and the National Center for State Courts. See also
Rosenberg, Planned Flexibility to Meet Changing Needs of the Federal Appellate System,
59 CORNELL L. REV. 576 (1974).
31
Owens, The Hruska Commission's Proposed National Court of Appeals, 23 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 580, 599 (1976).
32
COMMISSION: STRUCTURE, supra note 28, at 32-38, 67 F.R.D. at 238-46.
33
Id. at 30, 67 F.R.D. at 237.
34
Id. at 5, 13, 67 F.R.D. at 208, 217.
35
Id. at 13-16, 67 F.R.D. at 217-21.
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a complex field oflaw in which problems were caused not so much
by actual unresolved conflicts between the circuits as by perceived
disparities in results, a condition that encouraged unbridled
forum- shopping. 3 6
A number of objections were raised to the Hruska Commission
proposal: it could create a significant additional burden on the Supreme Court to act as a "switching station;" it would establish a
fourth tier within the federal judicial system; and it would be unlikely to ease substantially the pressures on the regional courts of
appeals because, although these courts could avoid decisions on
the merits of some cases by transferring them to the new court, the
transfer decision itself would take time and could prove troubling
and divisive. 37
As the preceding summary indicates, the Hruska Commission
proposal and other structural reform efforts have shared a common
weakness: either the Supreme Court would be helped and the
courts of appeals would be left unaided, or vice versa. 38 Most critics of these proposals have agreed, however, that the evidence
has shown a system that was not working well, even though the
problem might notjustify a National Court of Appeals in the mold
suggested by the Study Group or the Commission. 39
Whatever the merits or lack of merits of earlier proposals, as a
practical matter it does not appear likely that any of the suggestions
for appellate court reorganization that have been previously circulated will be adopted by Congress within the next several years.
But the problems remain. 40 It would be irresponsible to ignore
them.

36 ld. at 15, 67 F.R.D. at 220. See also H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 155 (1973), reprinted in part in APPELLATE JUSTICE: 1975, supra note 30, at 2.
37 G. CASPER & R. POSNER, WORKLOAD, supra note 1, at 105; DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMITTEE ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM, REPORT ON THE NEEDS OF
THE FEDERAL COURTS 18 (1977); Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate
System, 1975 Hearings -929, 966, 1312, 1317 (1975) statements of Haworth, Carrington,
Friendly and A. Goldberg) [hereinafter cited as Commission Hearings for the respective
year]; Owens, supra note 31, at 599-602; The National Court ofAppeals Act: Hearings on S.
2762 and S. 3423 before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at (1976) (statement of Judge Frank
M. Coffin).
38
See, e.g., Wiener, Federal Regional Courts: Solution for the Certiorari Dilemma, 49
A.B.A.J. 1169 (1963) (proposing a fourth tier above the existing courts of appeals); Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old Pyramids: Reshaping the Judicial System, 44 S.CAL. L.REv. 901,
910-11 (1971) (suggesting the creation of an appellate division for the federal district courts).
39 Alsup, Reservations on the Proposal of the Hruska Commission to Establish a National
Court of Appeals, 7 U. To LEDO L. REV. 431, 435 (1976); Feinberg, A National Court of Appeals, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 611, 624-27 (1976); Owens, supra note 31, at 598.
• 0 The nature of the unsolved problems is addressed by Justice White and Chief Justice
Burger in recent dissents to denial of certiorari in Brown Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc.,_
U.S._, 99 S. Ct. 626 (1978). Both justices seem to call upon Congress to create in some
form a National Court of Appeals.
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C. Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978

These problems will not be solved by enactment of the Omnibus
Judgeship Act. 41 This Act is unlikely to alleviate docket congestion
permanent} y, and it will not increase the capacity of the federal judicial system for definitive adjudication of issues of national law. 42
Continued growth in district court caseloads is predictable. As
newly-appointed district judges generate increased outputs at the
trial level, the courts of appeals will be placed back in the position
·in which they now find themselves. At least as problematic is the
fact that the bill will create 35 new appellate judges who must be
integrated into the system, a task that becomes more difficult as the.
courts increase to near-convention size. 43 Dispositions by the new
appellate judges will likewise increase the burden on the Supreme
Court.
Furthermore, creating additional judgeships without enacting
more fundamental changes in the appellate system will make it
more difficult to maintain coherent legal doctrine nationwide. Increasing the number of decision-making entities makes it more
likely that inconsistent legal doctrine will be pronounced. Since the
Supreme Court's capacity cannot be enlarged significantly, the result will be an even greater difficulty in achieving authoritative decisions that are nationally binding.
D. Imperatives of Federal Court Restructuring

The discussions provoked by the Study Group, the Hruska
Commission, the American Bar Association, 44 and the Advisory
Council for Appellate Justice 45 produced agreement on imperatives, stated in various ways, that must be considered in any future
court reform effort. By "imperatives" we mean those principles
that, for reasons of public opinion or sound policy, may not be ignored. In relation to the appellate system these imperatives are:
1. No fourth tier should be added to the federal judicial system.
2. Any new appellate tribunal must consist of permanent Article
41
Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (to be codified at 28 U .S.C. § 133
note).
42
See Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Couns of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the Nationa/Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 544-46 (1969); cf. H.
FRIENDLY, supra note 36, at.38-39.
43
JusncE oN APPEAL, supra note 19, at 141.
44 See House Favors National Division for Federal Courts of Appeals, 60 A.B.A.J. 453
(1974).
45 See ADVISORY CoUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE, Recommendation for Improving the
Federal Intermediate Appellate System, in APPELLATE JUSTICE: 1975, supra note 30, at 163;
1974 Commission Hearings, s_upra note 37, at 106 (Statement of Professors Rosenberg and
Carrington), reprinted in APPELLATE JUSTICE: 1975; supra note 30 at 186.
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III judges who have important adjudicative tasks.
3. If a new court is created, its jurisdiction and position in the
system should be such as not to diminish the status of existing
courts and judges.
4. Undue specialization of courts and judges should be a voided.
5. Any new tribunal should provide flexibility in the federal
court system to meet changing docket conditions.
6. Access to and review by the Supreme Court should remain
available.
7. The number of judges or courts within the federal judiciary
should not be unduly expanded.
8. A new court should operate free of jurisdictional disputes. 46
Can some rearrangement be maqe within the federal appellate
structure to increase the capacity of that appellate system to render
authoritative decisions on national matters while observing these
imperatives of appellate court reform? The evidence suggests that
a modest yet significant step in that direction can be taken by implementing the proposal described here.
II.

IN

AREAS OF FEDERAL LITIGATION

WHICH SPECIAL NEEDS EXIST

Although none of the previous recommendations for restructuring the federal appellate sys tern has proven acceptable thus far, the
problems that gave rise to those proposals continue. Knowledgeable lawyers and judges have long recognized three fields of federal
litigation in which nonuniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine
are especially pronounced. These are tax law, patent law, and environmental law. Although many areas of general federal law might
benefit from special attention, this proposal is designed to take care
of the fields of law in which the problems of inconsistent adjudication are most grave. For that reason, it focuses on civil tax, patent, and environmental cases.
A. Areas Particularly Affected By Lack of Binding Precedent

Based on the evidence_ that it had compiled, the Hruska Commission singled out tax and patent appeals as being most appropriate for special treatment. 47 On a list of eight critical issues "on
which serious uncertainty exists," the Commission included one
•• This list synthesizes the suggestions of Griswold, supra note 22, at 335-37; Hufstedler,
supra note 22, at 547-48; Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 587; Rosenberg, Enlarging the Federal Courts' Capacity to Settle the National Law, IO GoNz. L. REV. 709, 715-16 (1975).
47 COMMISSION: STRUCTURE, supra note 28, at 34, 67 F.R.D. at 241.
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patent dispute and three tax questions. 48 Furthermore, in a Commission survey of practitioners, both the tax and patent bars indicated that uncertainty created by the lack of national precedent
was a significant problem, 49 and the Commission singled out patent
law as an area in which widespread forum-shopping is particularly
acute. 50 On this evidence, even critics of the Commission's National Court of Appeals have conceded that a good argument could
be made for concentrating tax and patent appeals in national
forums with exclusive appellate jurisdiction of those cases. 51
Environmental cases are another category in which special need
may exist. 52 Although the environmental statutes are of fairly recent origin, significant conflicts have already arisen. 53 The language of those statutes is ambiguous in certain crucial respects.
The National Environmental Policy Act has been described as "a
statute whose meaning is more uncertain than most, not merely because it is relatively new, but also because of the generality of its
phrasing," 54 and as a statute that is "fashioned in a manner calculated to breed litigation. " 55 As a result of these problems, one
48

Id. at 22-25, 67 F.R.D. at 227-31.
Id. at 144-57, 67 F. R.D. at 361-76.
••Id.at 152, 67 F.R.D. at 370; see Feinberg, supra note 39, at 622.
51
Feinberg, supra note 39, at 622. See also 1975 Commission Hearings, supra note 37, at
1314-15 (letter from Friendly, J.):
49

One is immediately struck by the high proportion of issues deemed suitable for the
National Court that consists of tax cases. In my own thinking I must eliminate
these for I remain convinced of the validity of the solution ... which would take
these cases away from the court of appeals, thereby giving these courts significant
relief ....
The report also has a good deal to say about intercircuit conflicts in patent cases.
With relatively few exceptions these conflicts are not over true questions of law but
rather reflect varying intuitions of judges on the application of the test ... [of
non-obviousness]. 35 U .S.C. Section 103. These varying intuitions ... can be
ended only by placing all patent litigation in a single court.
52
Environmental cases are defined by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts as "any cases filed under the National Environmental Policy Act ... and any other
environmental allegations pertaining to air, water, solid waste, pesticides, radiation, and
noise pollution." 1977 ANNUAL REPORT; supra note I, at 211. This definition is adopted for
the purpose of this article. It includes all cases arising under Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 7 U .S.C. §§ 136a-136y (1976); Coastal Zone Management Act of
1972, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-1464 (West 1974 & Supp. 1978); Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U .S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (West 1978); Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of
1968, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 236a-n (West 1974 & Supp. 1974-77); National Environmental Policy
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U .S.C. §§ 4901-4918
(1976); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U .S.C.A. §§ 6901-6987 (West 1977); and the Clean Air
Act, 42 U .S.C.A. §§ 7401-7442 (West Supp. 1977). This category of cases could, of course,
be enlarged or contracted.
53 See, e.g., E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); Kleppe v. Sierra
Oub, 427 U.S. 390 (1976); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
54
Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 642 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 409 U.S. 9'JO (1972).
55
Whitney, The Case for Creating a Special Environmental Court System, 14 WM. &
MARYL. REV. 473, 489 (1973).
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commentator has concluded that "agency action is being seriously
impeded for lack of consistent judicial interpretation having precedential value." 56
B. Proposals for Special Treatment of These Areas

In the recognition that special concerns exist in these areas of the
law, Congress has established multiple avenues of review for tax,
patent, and environmental cases, including several specialized tribunals. Unfortunately, this system has often proven dysfunctional
and counterproductive. As an alternative approach, some commentators have advocated the establishment of special appellate
courts with exclusive national jurisdiction over one of these areas
oflitigation. 57 Despite the urgency of the problems, and despite attractive arguments in favor of each of these recommendations,
there has been considerable opposition to the concept of creating
narrowly specialized courts with jurisdiction of only a single area
of litigation. 58 An examination of present review procedures and
previous suggestions for special treatment of these areas is useful
to an understanding of the present proposal to create a new appellate court with jurisdiction of all three types of cases.
1. Tax Law - Today a taxpayer has three possible forums for
tax litigation: the Tax Court, a federal district court, or the Court of
Claims. The choice of court depends on whether the taxpayer is
willing or able to pay the demanded taxes.
If the taxpayer refuses or is unable to pay, he must litigate his
contention in the Tax Court of the United States. 59 The Tax Court
considers itself to be a national court bound only by a Supreme
Court decision or a circuit opinion "squarely in point where appeal
lies to that Court of Appeals and to that court alone.' ' 60 Soon after
the Tax Court stated this rule, it was presented with identical issues in separate litigations, one of which would have been appealable to the Eighth Circuit and one to the Fifth Circuit. The Eighth
Circuit had not ruled on the issue, and there was no precedent to
follow; the Tax Court in that case ruled in favor of the government. 61 The Fifth Circuit, however, had previously decided the
issue in favor of the taxpayer; the Tax Court felt bound to follow
56

Id. at 501.
See, e.g., Whitney, supra note 55; Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57
HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1944).
58
See, e.g., 1975 Commission Hearings, supra note 37, at JI&> (statement of Caplin); Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized Judiciary, 37
A.B.A.J. 425 (1951).
59
I.R.C. § 7442.
60 Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970).
61
Kenneth W. Doehring, [1974) T.C.M. (P-H) ,r 74,234.
57
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that rule and therefore ruled in favor of the taxpayer. 62 These cases
illustrate the potentially inconsistent results that taxpayers must
consider if they decide to litigate before the taxes are paid.
Appellate review of decisions of the Tax Court takes the form of
an inverted pyramid, with the cases fanning out over the entire
country to the eleven regional courts of appeals. Review in each
case is in the circuit in which the taxpayer is located. 63 Review of
Tax Court decisions by the regional appellate courts is not, however, an effective means of producing uniformity of treatment for
.taxpayers. For example, in another set of cases, two brothers who
lived in different circuits were co-owners of the same exclusive
right to open Dairy Queen franchises in the State of Washington.
When they appealed a decision of the Tax Court to their respective
circuit courts of appeals, one brother obtained the benefit of capital
gains treatment for money received from sales of individual franchise outlets, while the other brother was required to treat the payments as ordinary income in the nature of royalties: 64 Thus, these
taxpayers received disparate treatment of the most blatant kind
simply because of the absence of a controlling national tax forum. 65
A taxpayer with the financial ability and willingness to pay the
tax under protest has some choice as to the forum in which to sue
for a refund. One alternative is to file suit in federal district court.
Under most circumstances, the taxpayer may file suit in the federal
district court in which he resides or, in the case of a corporation, in
the federal district court in which the principal place of business is
located. 66 Alternatively, suits may be filed in the United States
Court of Claims, which is located in Washington, D. C. 67 District
court decisions are reviewable by the regional courts of appeals
and the Supreme Court, 68 while Court of Claims decisions are reviewable by the Supreme Court. 69
For at least the past forty years, distinguished legal com-

Paul E. Puckett, [1974] T.C.M. (P-H) ,i 74,235.
I.R.C. § 7482(b)(i). See Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income, Estate and Gift Taxes -A Criticism and a Proposal, 38 CoLUM. L. REV. 1393, 1406-11
(1938).
64
Compare Theodore E. Moberg v. Commissioner, 310 F. 2d 782 (9th Cir. 1962) with Vern
H. Moberg v. Commissioner, 305 F. 2d 800 (5th Cir. 1962).
65
For additional criticism see 1975 Commission Hearings, supra note 37, at 1178 (statement of Caplin); Leventhal, supra note 9, at 896 n.55.
66
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1391(b), 1402(a) (1976). Under a circumstance in which a corporation
has no principal place of business, a tax refund suit should be filed in the district in which the
tax return was made or, if no return was made, in the District Court for the District of Columbia. 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(2) (1976).
67
28 u.s.c. § 1491 (1976).
68
26 U .S.C. § 7482{b){l)(l976); 28 U .S.C. § 1254 (1976).
69
28 U .S.C. § 1255 (1976). Cases in the Court of Claims proceed through the equivalent of
trial and appeal. See notes 128-35 and accompanying text infra.
62
63
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men ta tors have advocated a national court to review tax cases. 70 A
detailed proposal to consolidate all tax appeals in the Court of
Claims was presented to the Hruska Commission, 71 but that body
rejected the idea. Several observers indicated, however, that in
their view the evidence suggested that it was time to create national
courts of tax and patent appeals. 72
Scholarly writings supporting a specialized tax court are replete
with examples of direct conflicts among the courts that review tax
cases. 73 As many as ten years may elapse before a final decision is
reached on some tax issues. 7 4 Because of these conflicts and delay,
critical areas of the law remain open until the Supreme Court or
Congress resolves them. This failure to define the national law
adequately and quickly leads to uncertainty in legal doctrine and
severe consequences for the appellate system. Lack of uniformity
breeds forum-shopping as the attorneys for taxpayers scramble to
find a court with a decision directly in point with the special facts of
their case, or at least a court whose general approach to problems
leans toward the taxpayer's position. 75 This cynical approach to
appellate law can only breed disrespect for the judicial system. 76
The creation of an appellate tax court with jurisdiction to render
decisions that are binding nationwide would have material benefits
for the system. Such a court would introduce certainty into tax litigation. As a result, taxpayers would know more quickly whether to
settle or to press an issue - a development that could reduce court
congestion as taxpayers come to recognize areas of tax law in
which appeal would be frivolous. Predictability within the system
would contribute to equality of treatment for all taxpayers. Tax
planning might lose some of its excitement for the practitioner, 77
but citizens would know more clearly the tax consequences of their
actions. The Internal Revenue Service also would benefit from this
70 See Del Cotto, The Need for A Court of Tax Appeals: An Argument and a Study, 12
BUFFALO L. REV. 5 (1962); Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L.
REv. 1153 (1944); Lowndes, Federal Taxation and the Supreme Court, 1960 SUP. CT. REv.
222; Traynor & Surrey, New Roads Toward the Settlement of Federal Income, Estate, and
Gift Tax Controversies, 7 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 336 (1940); Traynor, supra note 63.
71 Cathcart, Unifying Federal Civil Tax Appeals (unpublished, on file in National Archives).
72 See G. CASPER & R. PosNER, supra note I, at 113; Feinberg, supra note 39, at 627; National Court of Appeals Act: Hearings on S. 2762 and S. 3423 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. I, at 84 (1976) (statement ofT. Sandalow) (case not made by Commission except in
tax); id. at 238-39 (statement of Judge Friendly) (case made for tax and patent appeals).
73 See, e.g., Miller, A Court of Tax Appeals Revisited, 85 YALE L. J. 228, 234-35 (1975).
74
1975 Commission Hearings, supra note 37, at 1350 (statement of New York State Bar
Association, Tax Section).
75
See 1975 Commission Hearings, supra note 37, at 1179 (statement of Caplin).
16
See Del Cotto, supra note 70, at 8.
17
See COMMISSION: STRUCTURE, supra note 28, at 151 (letter from Cleveland, Ohio, practitioner).
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certainty of legal doctrine since it would reinforce our tax system,
which depends upon self-assessment and administrative resolution
of controversies. 78 In addition, channelling tax litigation to a single
forum would encourage expertise in the resolution of tax cases, 79
and thereby reduce the time necessary to decide those cases. 80
2. Patent Law- There are also three possible forums for patent
litigation. Adjudication of patent issues is in the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (CCPA), a federal district court, or the Court of
Claims. The choice of forum depends partially on the nature of the
action.
If the Patent and Trademark Office denies a patent, the disappointed applicant may choose between review of the decision in
the CCPA 81 or suit against the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. 82 A loser in a patent interference proceeding may appeal
to the CCPA83 or may file a civil action in federal district court,
where the issues will be considered de novo. 84 This suit will be subject to the general rules of venue and in personam jurisdiction. 85
The winner in an interference proceeding, as appellee, may exercise the option to "remove" the case from the CCPA to federal district court. 86 Review of CCPA decisions is in the Supreme Court,
while review of decisions of the District of Columbia District Court
is in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and
the Supreme Court. 87
Jurisdiction of suits for infringement of patents or for declaratory
judgments of non-infringement is in the federal district courts. 88
Thus, because district courts throughout the United States handle
1975 Commission Hearings, supra note 37, at 1179 (statement of Caplin).
See Henke, The Tax Court, the Proposed Administrative Court, and Judicia/ization, 18
BAYLOR L. REV. 449, 450-452 (1966).
80
See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 36, at 162-63; 1975 Commission Hearings, supra note 37,
at 1350. See also Heckerling, The Quest for Tax Certainty: A Court of Tax Appeals, 40
TAXES 37 (1962). Judge Learned Hand described the difficulty for the uninitiated:
78

79

In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax ... merely dance
before my eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference to cross-reference,
exception upon exception - couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize
hold of - leave in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but
successfully concealed, purport, which it is my duty to extract, but which is within
my power if at all, only after the most inordinate expenditure of time.
Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947).
81 35 u.s.c. § 141 (1976).
82
35 u .s.c. § 145 (1976).
83 35 u.s.c. § 141 (1976).
84 35 u.s.c. § 146 (1976).
8s Id.
86 35 u .s.c. § 141 (1976).
87 28 u .s.c. §§ 1254, 1256, 1291 (1976).
88 28 u.s.c. § 1338 (1976); 35 u.s.c. § 281 (1976).
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patent cases, each of the eleven circuit courts of appeals renders
decisions on patent questions. 89 Further review is by writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. 90
The Court of Claims decides patent cases in which the United
States is an alleged infringer. 91 The decisions of the court are reviewable by the Supreme Court. 92
Although there are some actual unresolved conflicts in patent
law, the primary problem in this area is uncertainty which results
from inconsistent application of the law. Because of this situation,
the argument for centralized review of patent cases may be more
subtle than the rationale for national review of tax cases, but it is
equally compelling.
Even in circumstances in which there is no conflict as to the actual rule of law, the courts take such a great variety of approaches
and attitudes toward the patent system that the application of the
law to the facts of an individual case can produce different results
in different courtrooms. Perceived disparities between the circuits
cannot be explained away by vague references to happenstance. 93
This condition has led to "mad and undignified races" between alleged infringers and patent holders to be the first to institute proceedings in the forum they consider most favorable. 94
The almost non-existent attention that the Supreme Court gives
this area is of little help. One would hardly expect consistency of
legal doctrine when the frequency of review of certain patent issues
by the Court may be no greater than once every sixteen years. 95
As long as the effect of an adverse adjudication was limited to a
particular circuit, perhaps no great harm was done. Until recently,
the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel required that for the patentee
to be bound by a prior decision, the alleged infringer must also be
bound. 96 Since the litigating parties were rarely identical, multiple
litigations occurred, stare decisis being the only deterrent. In
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 97 however, the Supreme Court announced the demise of the
requirement of mutuality of estoppel. The stakes in an individual
patent litigation have thereby grown because a loss by the patentee
28 U .S.C. §§ 1291, 1292(a)(4), 2201, 2202 (1976).
28 u.s.c. §§ 1254 (1976).
91 28 u .s.c. § 1498 (1976).
92 28 u.s.c. § 1255 (1976).
93 See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 36, at 155 n .11.
94
Id. at 155.
95 The length of time between the decisions in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1
(1966), noted in 44 TEXAS L. REv. 1405 (1966), and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
96 Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936).
9.7 402 u .s. 313 (1971).
89

90
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on the issue of validity may bind him in all subsequent litigation.
While this is a salutary development in that it reduces multiple litigations over the same patent, the effect is to settle the validity of
the patent under one circuit's view of the law and its approach in
applying the law, which may differ sharply from that of other circuits. In other words, although the Blonder-Tongue rule may settle
certain issues as to a particular patent, it does little to establish nationally uniform administration of patent law. Moreover, because
the first court to decide a case will settle the validity of the patent,
this new estoppel effect may even intensify forum-shopping.
Another argument used to support a separate ,court for patent
appeals is that in this area judges with little technical expertise
must try to decide, for example, whether a chemical patent is valid
and infringed. A stroll through the Smithsonian Institution reveals a
display of patented devices used for hanging wearing apparel from
a taut cord to aerate them - clothes-pins. A stroll through the
Federal Reporter, Second Series, will reveal cases such as Application of Edwards, 98 dealing with the patentability of Water Insoluble Nitrogen-Containing Polyols. Therein lies the difference in the
nature of patent cases facing the courts today from those of earlier,
less complex times. 99 Almost all judges make at least the perfunctory boast that they are able eventually to master the factual
material, but often it is not without the expenditure of an unusual
amount of time and energy. 100 Thus many observers favor bringing
a greater degree of expertise to the patent area by creating a special
court for these cases. 101
3. Environmental Law-Among the first problems to arise in litigation under the Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act was whether cases should be filed in the
district court or the court of appeals. These statutes have been

98

568 F. 2d 1349 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
Cf. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I, 19 (1966) (noting the advance of technology).
100
In one case Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit wrote:

99

This patent appeal is another illustration of the absurdity of requiring the decision of such cases to be made by judges whose knowledge of the relevant technology derives primarily, or even solely, from explanations by counsel and who, unlike the judges of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, do not have access to a
scientifically knowledgeable staff.
General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Jefferson Chem. Co., 497 F.2d 1283, 1284 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 968 (1974). See Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States, 320 U .S.1, 60-64
(1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part). See also Marovitz, Patent Cases in the District
Couns - Who Should Hear Them? 51 IND. L.J. 374, 375 (1976); 1974 Commission Hearings,
supra note 37, at 425-27 (statement of Pell, J.).
101
H. FRIENDLY, supra note 36, at 156-59; Marovitz, supra note 100, at 379; 1975 Commission Hearings, supra note 37 (statements of Prof. Gambrell and Lay, J.).
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described as containing judicial review provisions that are "in
some respects inconsistent, incomplete, ambiguous and unsound." 102 Merely "[s]orting out who may take which cases to
what courts and when they may do so under these provisions has
already yielded a bumper crop of litigation.'' 103 For example,
Section 307 of the Clean Air Act gave jurisdiction to the courts of
appeals to review approval and promulgation of state implementation plans. 104 Some district courts, however, construed challenges to the Administrator's inclusion or exclusion of clauses
from such plans to be within their own jurisdiction to review
ministerial actions as provided by Section 304 of the Act. 105 This
ambiguity has prompted the introduction in Congress of a bill, not
yet enacted, that would allow corrective transfer between the
courts of appeals and the district courts when the court of filing
lacked jurisdiction. 1 06
Under the Clean Air Act, review of national standards was
placed in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, while jurisdiction to review local standards was in the
United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the affected
air quality control region was located. 107 In contrast, the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act provided only for local review. 108 This
bifurcation left the courts of appeals in a state of confusion as to the
proper reviewing forum. 109
In addition, the technical and special nature of the environmental
statutes 110 presents special problems. The courts are keenly aware
of the complexities of this legislation and the pertinent regula102

Recommendations of the Administrative Conference at the United States, 1 C.F.R.

§ 305.76-4(a) (1978).
103 Currie, Judicial Review Under Federal Pollution Laws, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1221, 1225
(1977).
104 42 U .S.C. § 1857h-5 (1976), as amended and renumbered by Oean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7607(b)(l)(West Supp. 1977).
10 • 42 U .S.C. § 1857H-2(a), as amended and renumbered by Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1977, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604 (West Supp. 1977). See Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 352 F.
Supp. W7, 707-08 (D. Colo. 1972), rev' d; 482 F. 2d 1301, 1304-054 (10th Cir. 1973); Sierra
Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253, 254 (D.D.C. 1972), affd mem., 4 ENVIR. REP.
(BNA) 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1972), affd per curiam by an equally divided court sub nom. Fri v.
Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
0
• • H.R. 11276, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
107 42 U.S.C.A. § 7607(b)(I) (West Supp. 1977). See S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
41 (1970).
Problems in review procedure for environmental cases are exacerbated by the fact that the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is now seriously behind in its
work. The D.C. Circuit had 1180 cases pending as of December 31, 1977, and it had 274 cases
ready for argument but not set. This backlog may be as much as two years' worth of work.
Interview with Charles Nelson, Circuit Executive, District of Columbia Circuit, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 9, 1978).
• 0 • 33 U .S.C. § 1369(b)(I) (1976).
0
• • See generally Currie, supra note 103, at 1262-71.
110
The environmental statutes are listed in note 52 supra.
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tions. 111 The Supreme Court in a related context has characterized
these cases as "complex" and filled with "novel scientific issues. " 112
Because of the unique nature of this field of law, Congress in
1972 directed the President through the Attorney General to study
whether a special system of courts should be established to handle
environmental matters.11 3 Congress manifested concern that increased environmental litigation, combined with the complex nature of the statutes, the sophisticated technology involved in pollution control, and increased judicial activism in the area might make
the creation of a specialized court system appropriate. 114
The investigation, conducted by the Land and Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice, focused on a
specialized court system with original and possibly appellate jurisdiction of environmental cases. 115 The Report did not evaluate a
court that would have only appellate jurisdiction of environmental
cases and no trial jurisdiction. Although the Attorney General's
Report indicated that ''there is confusion as to what the law is on
certain environmental matters," 116 it concluded that a specialized
court system solely for environmental cases was not warranted at
that time. It raised certain specific objections to such a specialized
court: the total number of environmental cases was not sufficient
to justify the creation of a separate court system; jurisdictional
problems could arise; the judges on a court handling only a single
category of cases could develop prejudices on the issues and an

111
See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F. 2d 1011, 1025-26 (D.C.Cir. 1978)
(McGowan, J.); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F. 2d 615, 641, 647-48
(D.C. Cir. 1973)(Leventhal, J.).
112
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemical Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 504 (1971). The scientific and technical nature of environmental issues present special problems for nontechnical judges. See
Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Information in Environmental Decisionmaking, 48
So. CAL. L. REV. 371 (1974); LaPierre, Technology-Forcing,and Federal Environmental
Protect Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771 (1977).
113
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500, § 9, 86
Stat. 816, 899.
114
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS, FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS cf 1972, H.R. REP. No. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 143 (1972).
115
Report of the President, Acting Through the Attorney General, on the Feasibility of
Establishing an Environmental Court System (October 11, 1973). The Report was based in
part on three hypothetical models of environmental court systems. One model was based on
the structure of the Court of Claims. The court would have had both original and appellate
jurisdiction and would have considered environmental cases generally. A second model posited a court to review orders of federal agencies that could affect the environment. A third
model would have established an environmental court to review order of designated federal
agencies. Under any of these systems, the court would have been created under Article III,
and its decisions would have been subjected to review only in the Supreme Court by certiorari.
116
/d. at Vl-25. The Report invites the reader to compare Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger,
427 F. 2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973) with Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F. 2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 905 (1973f
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overly narrow view of the law; and, the Supreme Court might benefit from seeing various approaches by the lower courts to the same
issue in a relatively new area of the law . 11 7
Although the Attorney General's Report recommended against a
specialized court with exclusive jurisdiction of environmental
cases, Congress has recognized that environmental litigation presents special and serious· problems for the appellate courts. Consequently, Congress has established, at least under the Clean Air
Act, centralized review of some issues in the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.11 8
C. Existing National Courts With Tax, Patent, and
Government Claims Jurisdiction

Already in place in the federal judicial system are two national
courts that are, or at least operate as, appellate tribunals: the Court
of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. A familiarity with the nature of those courts is essential to an understanding of the proposal described below.
1. The Court of Claims-The Court of Claims was created in 1855
primarily to relieve the pressure on Congress of the volume of private bills.11 9 It was declared by Congress in1953 to be an Article III
court, 120 an assessment confirmed by the Supreme Court. 121 The
court is composed of seven judges. 122 It sits both en bane and in
three-judge panels. 123 The court's headquarters are in Washington,
D.C., but it can and does sit elsewhere, usually in San Francisco,
to hear cases from the West. 124
The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is quite general, for it is
limited only by the requirement that the United States must be the
Id. at VII-I.
42 U .S.C. § 7607(b)(l)(West Supp. 1977).
119 Act of February 24, 1855, Pub. L. No. 55-122, 10 Stat. 612. For a history of the Court of
Claims see Bennett, The United States Court of Claims, A 50-Year Perspective, 29 FED.
B.J. 284 (1970); Wiecek, The Origin of the United States Court of Claims, 20 Ao. L. REV.
387 (1968); A Symposium -Part II: The United States Court of Claims, 55 GEO. L. J. 573
(1967).
120 28 u.s.c. § 171 (1976).
The presentjudges of the Court of Claims represent a variety of backgrounds. Two members of the Court are former Deputy Solicitors General; one was in private tax practice in
Maryland; one was the U.S. Commissioner of Customs and a judge on the Customs Court;
one was an Assistant Attorney General of the Land and Natural Resources Division; one was
a former head of the General Services Administration and a war crimes prosecutor; and one
was a Commissioner on the Court of Claims. Complete biographies are contained in United
States Government Printing Office, CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
746-748 (1977).
121 Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
122 28 u.s.c. § 171 (1976).
123 28 u.s.c. § 175 (1976).
124
Interview with Frank T. Peartree, Clerk, United States Court of Claims, in Washington, D. C. (June 9, 1978).
111
118
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defendant. 125 The court has no injunctive power and no criminal
jurisdiction. Most of the court's general docket is made up of government contract and tax cases, with Indian claims cases, military
and civilian pay cases, and inverse condemnation cases making up
the bulk of the remainder. 126 Patent cases are heard whenever the
United States is the ultimate user or beneficiary of a product or
process allegedly infringing the rights of a patent owner. 127
By statute the Court of Claims is a court of first instance, 128 but
in reality its functions resemble those of an appellate court. With
the exception of major motions in cases commenced in the Court of
Claims (e.g., motions for summary judgment or motions to dismiss) and appeals from decisions originally filed before government contract boards under the Wunderlich Act, 129 initial determinations in the cases before this court are ordinarily made by one of
sixteen Court of Claims trial judges. 130 These trial judges issue all
interlocutory orders and preside over pretrial proceedings and the
trial itself in much the same manner as a district court judge con12 • 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976). See Evans, Current Procedures in the Court of Claims, 55
GEo.L.J. 422,422 (1966). The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1506 (1976), established the
basic jurisdiction of the court. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976). Generally, the court has
jurisdiction of "any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution,
or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract ... or for liquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28
U .S.C. § 1491 (1976). The court also considers renegotiation claims, 50 U .S.C. § 1218
(1976); oil spill cases, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (i)(1976); and.Indian claims, Pub. L. No. 95-69, 91
Stat. 273 (1977)(codified at 25 U .S.C. §§ 70v-3, s). The relief the court grants is limited to
monetary damages, except that it may order reinstatement when it determines that a government employee was improperly discharged. 28 U .S.C. § 1491 (1976). Although the
court has jurisdiction to hear Federal Tort Claims Act cases with the consent of both parties, 28 U. S.C. § 1504 (1976), the only such appeal ever filed was summarily dismissed on
the ground that the appellee had not so consented. Peartree, Statistical Analysis of the
Coun of Claims, 55 GEO. L.J. 541, 541 n.2 (1966); conversation with David Cook, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, in Washington, D:C. (August 15, 1978).
126
Report of the United States Coun of Claims for the Year Ended September 30, 1977
[hereinafter cited as 1977 Clerk's Report]. Most of the statistics regarding the Court of
Claims are taken from that Report. These Reports are ·usually reprinted in ·the Annual Report
of the Director of the Administrative Office. The 1977 ANNUAL REPORT, however, contains
the Clerk's Report for the previous year, which was published in the 1976 ANNUAL REPORT.
Compare 1977 ANNUAL REPORT 473, Table G-3A, with 1976 ANNUAL REPORT 402, Table
G-3A.
127
28 U .S.C. § 1498 (1976). See Davis, Trial of Patent and Copyright Cases in the U.S.
Court of Claims, 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v. 253,253 (1975). Twelve patent cases were filed
during the 1977 court year. 1977 Clerk's Report, supra note 126.
128 28 u.s.c. §§ 1491-1505 (1976).
129 41 U .S.C. §§ 321,322 (1976). The Wunderlich Act provides that an administrative decision in a government contract dispute shall be binding unless it is not supported by substantial evidence. id. See Gantt & Roberts, Wunderlich Act Review in the Court of Claims under
Bianchi, Utah, and Grace, 3 Pue. CONT. L.J. 7 (1970). Because appeals from government
contract boards therefore require no fact-finding by the Court of Claims, they go directly to
the Article III judges.
130 Referred to as trial commissioners in Title 28, these people in practice have been called
trial judges for several years. For a discussion of the treatment of cases commenced in the
Court of Claims, see Jacoby, Recent Legislation Affecting the Court of Claims, 55 GEO. L.J.
397, 399 (1966).
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ducting a nonjury trial. 131 Their functions are also analogous to
those performed by federal magistrates and special masters. Two
of the trial judges specialize in patent litigation. The trial judges
cover the country hearing cases, but only the Article III judges
may enter dispositive orders. 132 After the conclusion of a trial, the
trial judge prepares a report containing his findings of facts and his
recommended conclusions of law. Definitive action in the case is
then taken by the Article III judges, sitting either in a panel of three
judges or en bane. Review of Court of Claims decisions is available
by writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. 133 The trial judges, but
not the Article III judges, also adjudicate congressional reference
cases. 134
Thus, the Article III judges decide major motions and appeals
from findings of the trial judges on cases commenced in the Court
of Claims as well as appeals from decisions of government contract
boards. 135 The docket of the Article III judges is current and does
not appear heavy when compared with that of the regional courts
of appeals, but the generally lengthy nature of government contract
cases and numerous dispositions of cases by order appear
adequately to occupy the court. 136 Although the docket of the trial
judges is perhaps not as current as the docket of the court itself, 137
representatives of the court contend that anyone who wants a trial
131
See Cowen, A Symposium-Part/: The United States Court of Claims, Foreword, 55
GEO. L.J. 393, 395 (1966).
132
This information is taken from interviews by the authors with the Honorable Daniel
Friedman, Chief Judge, United States Court of Claims, in Washington, D.C. (June 9, 1978);
the Honorable Oscar H. Davis, United States Court of Claims, in Washington, D.C. (June
16, 1978); and with Frank Peartree, Clerk, United States Court of Claims, in Washington,
D.C. (June 9, 1978).
133
28 u.s.c. § 1255 (1976).
134
28 u.s.c. §§ 1492, 2509 (1976).
135
Decisions on cases heard originally by the trial judges are often made by a panel of
Article III judges acting in chambers. On Wunderlich Act cases, on cases in which exceptions have been taken by the parties to the trial judge's report, and on some major motions,
the Article III judges - sitting either in panels of three or en bane -decide cases after having heard one hour oral argument. Interview with Frank Peartree, Clerk, United States
Court of Claims, in Washington, D. C. (October II, 1978).
136
In 1977, the Article Ill judges of the Court of Claims wrote 122 majority opinions involving 139 cases. 1977 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note I, at 474. At the close of the year, the
Court had only 17 cases awaiting decision, of which 7 were being held "pending action in
other courts." 1977 CLERK'S REPORT, supra note 126.
137
All cases commenced in the Court of Claims are placed on the trial judge's docket,
where they remain until the case is refined to an issue of law and the trialjudge files a report
with the Article III judges. Thus, if a major motion is filed in a case, it may appear on the
dockets of both the trial judges and the Article Ill judges. The 1977 Clerk's Report, supra
note 126, shows 685 filings on the trial judges' dockets and 470 dispositions, with 1,158 petitions pending at the end of the court year. However, because there is much interplay between the dockets of the Article III judges and the trial judges, with cases "bouncing back
and forth" between the dockets, not all of these petitions will require the attention of a trial
judge. Interview with Frank Peartree, Clerk, United States Court of Claims, in Washington,
D.C. (October II, 1978). In Court of Claims terminology, a case is commenced by filing a
"petition," which is a pleading analogous to a complaint in district court.
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can get one quickly .138
2. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals-Created as the Court of
Customs Appeals in 1909, 139 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) acquired patent jurisdiction in 1929. 140 The court is
composed of fivejudges. 141 It was declared by Congress in 1958 to
be an Article III court, 142 a status sustained by the Supreme
Court. 143
The jurisdiction of the CCPA is fairly narrow. It hears appeals
from decisions of the U.S. Customs Court, 144 the Patent and
Trademark Office, 145 the U.S. International Trade Commission, 146
and from certain findings of the Secretaries of Commerce 147 and
Agriculture .148 The court has no jurisdiction of patent infringement
cases and no copyright jurisdiction.
As with the Court of Claims, the docket of the CCPA is current.149 Even if allowance is made for the complicated nature of the
CCPA's caseload, the court appears to have capacity for a larger
volume ofbusiness. 150 The average time for disposition of a patent
or trademark case in the CCPA has fallen from 31.5 months from
138 See interviews with the Honorable Daniel Friedman, the Honorable Oscar H. Davis
and Frank Peartree, note 131 supra.
139 Customs Administrative Act of 1890, Ch. 407 § 29, 26 Stat. 131, as amended by
Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, Pub. L. No. 61-5 § 29, 36 Stat. 11, 105 (current
version of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals is in scattered sections of 28 U .S.C.).
For a history of the Court, see Graham, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals: Its History,
Functions, and Jurisdiction, 1 FED. 8.A.J. 33 (1932).
140 Act of March 2, 1929, Ch. 488, 45 Stat. 1475 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1542
(1976)).
141 28 U.S.C. § 211 (1976). As in the Court of Claims, the judges of the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals also have varied backgrounds. Three were in the private practice of law,
one in Illinois, one in New York, and one in Texas, with two specializing in patents; one was
a United States Senator; and one was a commissioner on the Court of Claims. United States
Government Printing Office, 1977 CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 750-52
(1977).
142 Act of August 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-755, § I, 72 Stat. 848 (current version at 28
u.s.c. § 211 (1976)).
143 Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
144 28 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (1976).
145 15 u .s.c. § 1071 (1976); 28 u .s.c. § 1542 (1976).
146 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (c) (1976).
147 28 u.s.c. § 1544 (1976).
148 28 u.s.c. § 1545 (1976).
149 In 1977 the court had 193 filings and 198 dispositions. The Clerk's Report for that year
showed 30 customs, commerce, and international trade cases, and 163 patent and trademark
cases. 1977 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 473, Table G-2A.
Patent cases made up about 48% of the docket, or 93 cases annually. Interview with Chief
Judge Howard T. Markey, United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, in Washington, D. C. (June 21, 1978).
150 Evidence of this ability to handle additional cases is revealed by the frequent sittings
by two of the five CCPAjudges in other courts. During the 12-month period ending June 30,
1977, one of the judges sat 6 days on the circuit courts of appeals, hearing 26 cases; another
judge served 24 days in the courts of appeals, hearing 120 cases. 1977 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 1, at 522-28, Table V-2. These sittings on other courts are cited simply to show
that there is judge time available to be devoted to additional business, if there were such, in
the CCPA.
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filing to decision in1973 to 10.2 months in 1977. 151 Each judge on
the CCPA has two technical advisors to assist him in resolving
cases. These advisors are lawyers whose service is identical to that
of a law clerk, except that they also have technical degrees and experience in a scientific or engineering field or in patent law. They
serve for two years and confer with the judges on both legal and
technical matters. In addition, the court has a permanent Chief
Technical Advisor, who himself has a technical advisor/law clerk.
Among other duties, the Chief Technical Advisor is available to all
the judges for consultation on technical matters, and he reviews all
opinions that issue from the CCPA for consistency .152
Ill. A NEW FEDERAL INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT

Unquestionably, it is desirable for federal law to mean the same
thing everywhere. As the federal appellate court system is currently structured, however, it lacks the capacity to deliver within a
reasonable time decisions that are binding precedents nationwide.
This article has identified certain areas of the law as being particularly affected by a lack of authoritative decisions. The proposal described below is designed to eliminate uncertainties in these fields
and, at the same time, to increase the stability, uniformity, and
predictability of legal doctrine throughout the federal system.
A. The Proposal

The essence of the proposal is to create a new intermediate appellate court through the merger of the Court of Claims and the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. The new court would not be
interposed between the regional courts of appeals and the Supreme
Court. It would have equal status with present courts of appeals. It
might be called the "United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit" or the "United States Court of Special Appeals." The
new court would be staffed by the twelve judges of the two existing
courts plus three additional judgeships to be filled by Presidential
appointment, which would give the court fifteen authorized judgeships . 153 These positions would be that of United States Circuit
151

l'f77 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note I, at 473, Table G-2B.
Interview with Chief Judge Howard T. Markey, United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, in Washington, D. C. (June 21, 1978). See also 1975 Commission Hearings,
supra note 45, at 670-77 (statement of Markey, C.J.).
153
The present Article Ill judges of the Court of Claims and the CCPA could be converted
by statute into circuit judges of the new court. Thus, those judges who continue in active
service following creation of the new court would not need to be reappointed.
152
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Judge. Review of decisions of the court would be in the Supreme
Court by writ of certiorari.
The jurisdiction of the new court would be much the same as that
of the two present courts. Existing appellate review jurisdiction
would not be diminished in any way. In addition, however, the new
court would handle patent, civil tax, and environmental appeals,
both from the district courts and the Tax Court. 154 All ancillary or
pendent matters making up the case would also be included within
the jurisdiction of the new court. 155 Specifically, the new court
would have jurisdiction of all appeals from final decisions in:
(1) civil tax cases decided in all United States District Courts and
in the Tax Court arising under any Act of Congress relating to
income, estate, gift, or excise taxation, including extraordinary proceedings and suits for refund, for impartial assessments, for judgments against delinquent taxpayers, and to enforce summonses;
(2) patent cases decided in all United States District Courts arising under any Act of Congress relating to these subjects, including suits for injunctions against infringement and declaratory judgments of invalidity or non-infringement of patents; 156
(3) environmental cases decided in all U~ited States District
Courts arising under any of the environmental statutes previously listed; 157
(4) all claims under existing Court of Claims appellate jurisdiction, which consists of claims against the government,
primarily for money damages, in a wide variety of circumstances;
(5) all claims under existing Court of Customs and Patent Appeals jurisdiction, which consists of appeals from the Customs Court, the Office of Patent and Trademarks and other
specified govemmen t agencies.
Currently the Court of Claims performs a substantial trial function which, as already mentioned, is carried out by the trial judges
154 Although the original proposal suggested inclusion of environmental cases within the
jurisdiction of the new appellate court, after subsequent deliberation these cases have been
omitted from its jurisdiction in the legislation that has been developed to implement this proposal. Nevertheless, public comment on this aspect of the original proposal revealed sufficient interest to warrant expanded discussion here. See S. 1477, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
155 An additional statute to permit transfer betweln this new court and the existing courts
of appeals on jurisdictional grounds would be enacted. The Court of Claims already has such
a statute. 28 U .S.C. § 1506 (1976).
156
As to these cases, the jurisdiction of the new court of appeals could be defined as jurisdiction over appeals in all cases in which the jurisdiction of the district courts rests on 28
U .S.C. § 1338 (1976). This statute also includes plant variety protection cases. Occasionally
patent and federal tax issues arise in state litigation. These cases would not be affected by
the proposal.
157
See note 52 supra.
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rather than by the Article III judges. Under the proposal, the trial
judges of the old Court of Claims would be converted into a separate trial forum. This new trial forum could take one of three forms.
One would be an Article I court resembling the Tax Court of the
United States. 158 Another possibility would be to create an Article
III court resembling the Customs Court. 159 A third possibility
would be to convert the trial judges into a claims commission to
hear and decide all cases presently entertained by the Court of
Claims, with the exception of appeals from contract board decisions brought pursuant to the Wunderlich Act. 160 Whatever the organizational form, these trial judges would be given the power to
enter dispositive judgments, with appeals lying to the new court.
They would continue to hear cases in all parts of the country. Their
number could be increased, if necessary, to enable them to handle
the volume of cases in the future.
The new court would have its headquarters in Washington,
D.C., in the facilities of the two existing courts. It might sit in
panels in specified cities throughout the country, with additional
authority by rule of court to sit at other designated places. The regional courts of appeals now usually sit in panels of three judges. A
convincing argument may be made, however, for panels in the
new court of five judges each to increase doctrinal stability and
authoritativeness of decision. 161 A panel of five judges "is less
responsive to the erratic instincts of individual judges, and is
more likely to send up a warning signal of dissent if a decision is
contrary to the pattern established by the highest court.'' 162
Moreover, en bane procedures are unwieldly and of limited effectiveness as a control device in a court of fifteen judges. 163 These
enlarged panels would make it feasible to dispense with any en
158 The Tax Court consists of 16 members, including a chief judge, who are apP.ointed by
the President with the consent of the Senate for 15 year terms. 26 U.S.C. §§ 7441, 7443
(1976). Although the court is headquartered in Washington, D.C., the judges sit throughout
the United States. 26 U .S.C. § 7445 (1976). For a description of the history and functions of
the Tax Court, see Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis (pts. 1-3),
40 ALB. L. REv. 7, 53,253 (1976); Note, Procedural and Administrative Changes in the Tax
Court Created by the Tax Reform Act of /969, 8 Hous. L. REV. 395 (1970); Babbitt & Morris, An Introduction to the Tax Court of the United States, 21 TAX LAW. 615 (1968).
159 The Customs Court consists of nine judges, including a chief judge, who are appointed
by the President with consent of the Senate, who hold office "during good behavior." 28
U .S.C. §§ 251, 252 (1976). Although the court is headquartered at the port of New York, it
has statutory authority to sit any place within the jurisdiction of the United States. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 251, 256 (1976). For a description of the functioning of the United States Customs Court,
see Rao, A Primer on Customs Court Practice,40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 581 ( 1974).
160 This would in effect return the court to something close to its original status as an Article I forum with first instance jurisdiction over claims against the government. See Wiecek,
supra note 119.
161 See JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 19, at 159-60.
162
Id. at 159.
163
See id. at 161-63; COMMISSION: STRUCTURE, supra note 28, at 57-58, 67 F.R.D. at
265-66.
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bane procedure and provide for further review only in the Supreme Court. By gradual rotation of panel assignments by subject
matter category, five-judge panels could achieve a measure of ex-:
pertise while avoiding the pitfalls of undue specialization. No
single judge would sit on a subject-matter panel longer than a
specified period of time, perhaps three years. The system of assigning cases and judges to panels should be such as to assure that
over a period of years each judge of the court sits on panels hearing all categories of cases within the court's jurisdiction.
The existing system of technical advisors in the CCPA could be
enlarged to aid the judges of the new court. It has been suggested
that judges would frequently benefit from having access to such
advisors. 164 Although it may not be feasible to provide this system to all federal appellate judges nationwide, it would clearly be
practical to provide this kind of assistance to a single appellate
forum that handles a large concentration of technical and scientific
issues. Since some of the fifteen judges of the new court would at
times be sitting on cases not involving technical or scientific issues,
it would not be necessary for each judge to have personal technical
advisors as do the five judges of the CCPA. Instead, there could be
a pool of such advisors, who would also have law degrees, to
whom any judge could tum for assistance on a particular technical
problem. The size of this pool, and whether these advisors would
be permanent or short-term employees of the court, are matters
that can be determined later. Each of the fifteen judges of the new
court should also have two personal law clerks. The individual
judges would, of course, be free to follow the practice of the
CCPA, if they so desired, and to choose as clerks lawyers who also
have scientific degrees and expertise.
B. Advantages of the Proposal

In several respects, this proposal should be more acceptable
than previous recommendations for appellate court reorganization.
It is designed to avoid the objections to prior proposals and to meet
the imperatives that must be observed if any appellate court reform
effort is to succeed. 165
1. A Nonspecia/ized Court- Specialization is a major pitfall to
be avoided. Opposition to a court with jurisdiction limited to a
single, narrow category of cases rests on twin concerns: the court
could foster the development of "tunnel-visioned" judges who
164
See Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA.
L. REv. 509, 550-54 (1974).
165
See text accompanying note 46 supra.
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take too limited and arcane a view toward the development and application of the law; and the court would be vulnerable to capture
by a special interest.
The first of these concerns involves the apprehension that judges
on a specialized court could lose sight of the basic values at stake in
their decisions. Because the judicial process requires the unique
capacity to see things in their context, the development of tunnel
vision could lead to a branch of legal doctrine secluded from the
mainstream of the law and immunized ''against the·refreshment of
new ideas.'' 166
In part, the fear that vested interests might capture a specialized
court is a reaction to experiences with the Commerce Court. Established by Congress in 1910 after stormy debate, the court was
abolished in 1913. 167 The Commerce Court had been given jurisdiction over only a single category of cases that commanded extraordinary public attention in a populist era of our history. Although at
that time it was asserted that the Commerce Court was dominated
by the railroads, more recent research shows that the Commerce
Court suffered bad press and in fact was not supported by the very
interests by which it was alleged to have been captured. 168
Even if claims of railroad domination over the Commerce Court
had been accurate, the proposed court would not be likely to suffer
a similar fate. The current proposal for appellate court reform
avoids undue specialization of courts and judges. The new court
would handle civil tax, patent, and environmental matters, as well
as all matters now considered by the two existing courts. The combined jurisdiction of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and
the Court of Claims is quite broad. Court of Claims jurisdiction is
limited only by the requirement that the United States be the defendant in the suit. Cases before the court involve contracts,
trademarks, Indian claims, customs, commerce, international
trade, inverse condemnation, military and civilian pay claims, and
all related and pendent aspects of these cases. Moreover, tax, patent, and environmental cases contain a variety of issues. 169
Rifkind, supra note 58, at 426.
Act of Oct. 22, 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-32, 88 Stat. 208, 219. The history of the Commerce Court is detailed in F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME
COURT 162-73 (1928); its demise is analyzed in Dix, The Death of the Commerce Court; A
Study in Institutional Weakness, 8 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 238 (1964).
168 Dix, supra note 167, at 247.
169 For example, it has been said that "[t]here is hardly ever such a thing as a pure 'patent
case'," since often patent infringement suits also include allegations or defenses of "misuse,
fraud, inequitable conduct, violation of the antitrust laws, breach of trade secret agreements, unfair competition, and such common law counts as unjust enrichment." Kauper,
Statement Submitted to Hruska Commission, May 20, 1974, at 14 (unpublished; on file in
National Archives). Judge Miller of the CCPA has made a similar point. 1975 Commission
Hearings, supra note 37, at 125 I. Even experts in one of the most perplexing fields of law 166

167
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This rich docket assures that the work of the proposed n~w court
would be broad and diverse and not narrowly specialized. The
judges would have no lack of exposure to a wide variety of legal
problems. Moreover, the subject matter of the new court would be
sufficiently mixed to prevent any special interest from dominating
it. All citizens are constituents of tax matters. Although constituencies may exist in environmental matters, the competing
forces seem to have fairly equal strength. When patent cases and
claims of all sorts against the government are added to tax and environmental cases, it is clear that no single interest could muster
sufficient political influence to control a majority of the judges on
the court.
2. Avoids Previous Objections- The proposal also observes
other imperatives of appellate court reform that have emerged from
the experiences of recent years. First, it does not add a fourth tier
to the federal judicial system. The court would be part of the intermediate appellate level; the designated cases would go directly
from the trial courts to this court for review instead of going to one
of the regional courts of appeals.
Second, the proposed intermediate cou,rt would be composed of
permanent Article III judges who have important adjudicative
tasks. The new court would have basically the same mission as the
two existing courts, but it would have additional important and varied legal questions to decide.
Third, the jurisdiction and position of the new court within the
system would not diminish the status of existing courts and judges
since its location in the federal hierarchy would be on a level with
the regional courts of appeals.
The proposal also meets a fourth imperative of federal court reform - flexibility in the appellate system to meet changing docket
conditions. Once such a court was created, with nationwide appellate jurisdiction, Congress would have available a forum to which it
could add categories of business if it appeared in the future that a
special need had emerged for definitive national adjudication. Congress could also withdraw jurisdiction in later years if the need for
such a forum for the presently designated cases diminished in relation to other types of cases. 1 70
federal taxation - must constantly consider questions of property, contracts, agency,
partnerships, corporations, equity, trusts, insurance, procedure, accounting, economics,
ethics, and philosophy if they are to deal effectively with the many problems that make up
modem tax law. Griswold, supra note 70, at 1183-84.
170
An alternative suggestion, which would bring a higher degree of flexibility to the system, is that Congress vest the Supreme Court with authority to fix the intermediate court'.s
jurisdiction, within certain outer limits defined by statute. See JusncE ON APPEAL, supra
note 19,.at 175-76; Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 589.
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Fifth, access to and review by the Supreme Court would remain
available. Under this proposal certiorari review in the Supreme
Court would be preserved. However, the need for such review
would be iessened because of the enhanced authoritativeness and
uniformity of the decisions rendered by the new appellate court.
Furthermore, the proposal would not unduly expand the number
of judges or courts within the federal judicial system. This proposal
would require the creation of only three additional judgeships.
Moreover, the consolidation of the Court of Claims and the CCPA
would simplify the judicial structure and hence reduce problems of
judicial administration.
Finally, the proposal would be free of jurisdictional uncertainties. The new court's jurisdiction would be defined by statute, in
such a way as to leave little room for debate over jurisdictional
lines.
In addition to satisfying all the imperatives of appellate court reform, the proposal avoids criticisms raised in the Attorney General's Report evaluating a specialized environmental court system. 1 71 As it was explained above, the proposal would avoid problems of jurisdictional ambiguity and of over-specialized judges. In
addition, although the total number of environmental cases may
not have been sufficient to justify the creation of a separate court
system to consider only those cases, the new court, with a combination of types of issues, would have an adequate docket of complex and varied cases. Moreover, although the proposition that environmental issues may benefit from successive considerations by
several courts is one which may have superficial appeal, it does not
withstand analysis. In the first place, as previous sections of this
article have pointed out, it is illusory to consider Supreme Court
review as a solution to the lack of uniformity in environmental law.
Because of the limited proportion of cases that the Supreme Court
reviews, and because of the expense involved in seeking such review, it is unlikely that the Court will ever consider certain environmental issues, even if conflict exists among the circuits. Furthermore, environmental cases present issues in which '-'the gain
from maturation of thought from letting the matter simmer for a
while is not nearly as great as the harm which comes from years of
uncertainty [with respect to] questions which are essentially ones
of statutory construction." 172 Although the language of the environmental statutes may be unusually ambiguous, those statutes
govern areas of the society in which large-scale business planning
See notes 115-17 and accompanying text supra.
COMMISSION: STRUCTURE, supra note 28, at 78 (quoting 1974 Commission Hearings,
supra note 37, at 201 (statement of Erwin Griswold)).
171

172
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occurs; certainty and predictability in the interpretation of the law
are therefore vitally important to the national economy. Moreover,
although centralized review of environmental appeals would reduce the variety of approaches the courts have taken to these issues, the Supreme Court would still have the benefit of the multiple
viewpoints of the judges of the district courts throughout the United States.
3. Logistically Feasible-The proposal contains additional positive features. From a practical standpoint, a merger of the Court of
Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals could be accomplished with virtually no disruption to the people involved. The
existing courts already jointly occupy almost all of the Courts
Building on Lafayette Square in Washington, D. C., where there
appears to be room for additional judges' chambers. The two
courts share the same library, and court personnel share the same
dining facilities. Furthermore, a standing order of the Judicial Conference allows the interchange of judges between the two
courts. 1 73
Analysis of the workload of the proposed new court discloses
that this merger also could be accomplished easily in terms of
caseload. The dockets of both existing courts are current. 174
Based on the 1977 volume of business, the new court would be
handling 193 appeals that would otherwise have been heard by the
former CCPA, 175 384 cases that would have been heard by the
former Court of Claims, 176 and 651 cases coming directly from the

173
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 53 (September 23-24, 1976).
174 See notes 135 and 148 supra.
175
Caseload in the Court of Customs
& Patent Appeals - FY 1977
Type of Case
Filed
Terminated
Customs, Commerce and
34
30
International Trade

Patent and Trademarks

163

164

Total CCPA cases

193

198

1977 Annual Report, supra note I, at 473, Table G-2A.
The docketing of cases in the Court of Claims presents a confusing statistical picture to
the uninitiated. Some cases appear on the trial judges' docket and others appear on the docket of the Article III judges, while some cases are placed on both dockets. For purposes of
projecting the new court's caseload, the relevant statistics are not those that reveal the total
caseload of the Court of Claims but rather those that reflect the caseload of the Article III
judges on the Court. The following table contains those figures:
1 76
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district courts that would have been heard by the regional courts of
appeals . 1 77 This would provide a total docket of 1,228 cases. This
number of appeals would make an adequate but not unduly burdensome workload for a court of fifteen judges. Several· years ago
Professor Charles Alan Wright estimated that about eighty dispositions per year would be appropriate for a busy but not overworked
federal appellate judge. 1 78 The projected annual filings in the proposed court would break down to approximately eighty-two cases
per judgeship, which is lower than the per judgeship filings in any
of the regional circuit courts in 1977. 1 79
But filings per judgeship are not the only appropriate statistics.
Because the new court may be handling unusually complex and
technical cases, a more realistic picture of the workload can be
gained by considering the number of cases disposed of by the regional courts of appeals after oral hearing or submission on briefs.
These cases ran from a low of 336 in the First Circuit, for a total of
Appellate Caseload in the Court
of Claims - FY 1977
Total Disposition by Article III Judges
- In Chambers
- Calendared
- Requests for Review
Total Article III - Judge Workload

160
164
60 (est.)
384

Interview with Frank Peartree, Clerk of Court of Claims, in Washington, D.C. (August
16, 1978).
111
Appeals To Be Rerouted To the New Intermediate
Appellate Court (FY 1977 figures)
Source of Appeals
Total Appeals
Total Appeals from the Tax Court of the United States filed in
Courts of Appeals
213
Total U.S. Plaintiff Tax Cases filed in Court of Appeals
50
Total U.S. Defendant Tax Cases filed in Courts of Appeals
193
Patent Appeals Rerouted
95
Environmental Appeals Rerouted
100
Total Tax, Patent, and Environmental Appeals to be Rerouted
651
See 1977 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note I, at 305, Table 8-3; 310-13 table 8-7. The number of
environmental appeals was obtained from the Administrative Office from computerized
information regarding the number of appeals from the defined environmental cases in the
district courts. Special thanks to Raymond L. Kamery of that office for his help.
1 78
Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administration, 42 TEX. L.
REv. 949, 957 (1964). If the court sat in five-judge panels, the calculations would be
somewhat different since there are certain economies of scale from larger panels. Professor
Carrington has estimated that 94 dispositions per judge for a court working in five-judge
panels would keep a court busy but not inundated. See Federal Appellate Caseloads and
Judgeships: Planning Judicial Workloads for a New National Forum, in IV APPELLATE
JusncE: 1975, supra note 30, at 169.
179
1977 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note I, at 168, Table 3. Filings per judgeship in the
eleven circuits ranged from a low of 131 in the District of Columbia Circuit to a high of238 in
the Fifth Circuit.
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122 per judgeship, to a high of 2,181 in the Fifth Circuit, for a total
of 145 per judgeship. 180
Several other factors are relevant to an evaluation of the new
court's docket. The volume of appeals from -the Tax Court has remained steady over the last five years. 181 No reason appears to anticipate dramatic increases in that caseload. The number of patent
appeals on the other hand has declined in the past several years. 182
Surprisingly, environmental cases dropped by 16 percent from 1976
to 1977. 183 Moreover, as the new court brings uniformity and predictability to these areas of the law, the number of appeals resulting
from attempts to obtain different rulings on disputed legal points
can be expected to decrease. Another consideration is that currently the Article III judges of the Court of Claims spend a substantial portion of their time reviewing the work of the trial judges and
handling some trials in the first instance. Since this proposal would
establish a separate trial forum with the power to enter dispositive
judgments, the Article III judges would be relieved of these responsibilities and would have the capacity to handle additional
cases. Thus, the workload of the new court is likely to be adequate
but manageable.
Furthermore, the judges of the new intermediate appellate court
would possess the requisite abilities to handle the subject matter
included in the proposed docket of the court. The bulk of the cases
- tax and patent law - would not pose dramatically new issues
for most of the judges of the existing courts. Court of Claims judges
already decide tax and patent cases, and CCPAjudges are of course
well-versed in patent law. As noted above, these courts already
consider myriad issues. Furthermore, the judges of the existing
courts compare favorably with the bulk of courts of appeals judges.
In any event, because of the large number of appointments of
new judges that can be made, concerns about whether the present
judges of the two existing courts are well suited for the business of
the proposed court is a short-run, transitional matter and provides
no basis for objecting to the new appellate court. The proposal
would create three new judgeships to be filled by the President. Of
the twelve judgeships carried over from the existing courts, four
judges will be eligible to retire by 1979. Thus, with three additional

180

Id. at 179, Table 8 and 300-02, Table B-1.
The number of appeals has ranged between 213 and 269 between 1973 and 19n. 1977
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note I, at 305, Table B-3.
182
Patent appeals from all circuits totaled 95 in 1977. 1977 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note I,
at 311, Table B-7. The total number of patent appeals had been 127 in 1967. 1967 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note I, at 192-93, Table B-7.
183
See note 177 supra.
181
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judgeships and four retirements, seven new appointments could be
made by the time the new court becomes operational.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The consolidation of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals would be logistically and technically uncomplicated. Furthermore, it would make maximum use of
facilities and personnel already a part of the federal system. Not all
details of the proposal are worked out. For example, it is not essential that jurisdiction over environmental cases be included in the
scheme. While environmental cases exhibit special need for
nationwide uniformity and perhaps a measure of expertise, other
types of cases may be equally good candidates for inclusion in the
new court's jurisdiction. The most important objective should be to
create this new forum by merging the two existing courts. The precise jurisdictional contours can be worked out through congressional hearings.
Thus, the proposal makes only a modest change in federal appellate court structure. It would, however, bring desirable uniformity
to three unusually difficult areas of the law. The forum-shopping
common to these areas of litigation would be reduced. Business
planning would be made easier as more stable law is introduced.
Moreover, as the new court brings uniformity to these fields of law
the number of appeals resulting from attempts to obtain different
rulings on disputed legal points can be expected to decrease. In addition, consolidation of review of these cases would permit judges
to develop a measure of expertise in these complex fields, reduce
the amount of court time absorbed by these cases, and improve the
quality of decision in these areas.
At the same time, adoption of the proposal would relieve docket
pressures both on the regional appellate courts and on the Supreme
Court. Although the number of appeals to be redirected is not great
in proportion to the total caseload of these courts, the rerouted
cases contain some of the most complex and time-consuming issues that the courts consider. The impact of the new court on the
dockets of these courts therefore would be far greater than a first
glance at the raw numbers might indicate. The proposed new intermediate federal appellate court therefore would increase the
capacity of the judicial system for definitive adjudication of issues
of national law, while at the same time it would avoid the pitfalls
encountered by previous ideas for federal appellate court reform.

